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REVIEWS
SOFF ENERGY PATHS: TOWARD A DURABLE PEACE
By Amory B. Lovins
Friends of the Earth International, 1977. 231 pages. $15.
Distributed by Ballinger Publishing Co., Cambridge, Mass.
ISBN 0-88410-614-4

Reviewed by Charles H. Percy*
The quantity of attention given to energy today should not overwhelm us.
We must remember that until recently energy, as a subject unto itself, was
neglected. The social science of energy policy is still in its infancy.
Characteristic of its immaturity is the widespread belief that energy policy
means only energy supply policy. Among some of my Senate colleagues there
is a feeling that total decontrol of energy prices and subsidies for synthetic
fuels and new nuclear technologies would solve our problems. It is felt that
only this strategy would avoid great lifestyle changes. I disagree with this
view.
To consume our domestic and gas supplies even faster than we are now
is a policy of "strength through exhaustion" or "drain America first." We
would need to discover a new Alaskan North Slope every several years just
to stay even with rising demand and declining production from existing fields.
Growth in consumption of these nonrenewable supplies is just a sophisticated
way of stealing from our children. Total depletion of fossil fuels is the inevitable
result of continuously rising demand.
We need instead to recognize a most fundamental principle: energy is a
means, and not an end in itself. We should define the energy problem more
accurately as the challenge of meeting our social and economic goals with the
minimum amount of energy necessary. We must dispel the myth that increased
use of energy means a better life, and that less energy means a lower standard
of living.
In the fight to dispel such myths, a new spokesman is gaining prominence.
Through the work of Amory B. Lovins, the science of energy policy has taken
a quantum leap forward. His new book, Soft Energy Paths: Toward a Durable
Peace, lays aside the myths and superficial analyses that have been so prevalent.
In their place, he presents the complex web of interdependencies that influence,
and are influenced by, energy choices. What he calls "hard" and "soft" energy
paths differ not only in their energy generating techniques, but in their
approaches toward energy and toward fundamental factors affecting the quality
of people's lives. Where we are heading in energy use and where we are
heading as a society are bound inseparably together. Whether or not one
agrees with his conclusions, Lovins's approach to energy policy is sophisticated
and illuminating. It should be mandatory reading for anyone who wants to
participate constructively in the national energy debate.
*United States Senator from Illinois.
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Lovins sees the hard path as an extrapolation of the recent past. "It relies
on rapid expansion of centralized high technologies to increase supplies of
energy, especially in the form of electricity." The soft path "combines a prompt
and serious commitment to efficient use of energy, rapid development of
renewable energy sources matched in scale and in energy quality to end use
needs, and special transitional fossil fuel technologies." Examples of hard
technologies include oil and coal burning power plants, nuclear reactors, and
even centralized renewable resource devices such as orbiting solar collectors.
Soft technologies encompass solar collectors on an individual or community
scale, small wind turbines, local converters of waste products into alcohol fuels,
hydro-powered air compressors, and others.
In any new science, most important advances are achieved by asking the
most fundamental questions. "How can we expand energy supply to meet
growing demand?" is a naive question with hidden assumptions that tend to
bias the answer. As Lovins notes, the more effective question is "Who is going
to require how much of what kinds of energy for what purposes and how
long?" By asking first about end uses, energy assumes its rightful place as a
means to those ends.
Lovins claims that soft path technologies can be used to satisfy all our
end use needs. If that is true, and there is yet some question about it, then
the choice between paths must be based on a comparison of their economic
and social effects.
Lovins argues that the soft path is the more economical of the two. He
attempts to calculate the lifetime costs of energy units produced per end use
need satisfied. He concludes that soft path energy costs less than energy from
power plants and large scale fuel distribution systems. He admits that his
numbers are far from exact because he is trying to calculate very far-reaching
effects. But at the very least, his economic theories raise provocative questions
about the depth, scope and adequacy of current economic analyses of energy.
"It is not the technical or economic but the sociopolitical implications of
energy paths that are paramount both in moral importance and in practical'
impact on political acceptability," Lovins claims. In other words, the complex
implications of energy choices - until now never fully considered - should be
the most important factors in determining energy policy. These implications
could perhaps be summarized by the term "life-style changes." The soft path,
based on diversity and localization, would have multiple benefits. Lovins claims
it "simultaneously offers jobs for the unemployed, capital for business people,
environmental protection for conservationists, enhanced national security for
the military, opportunities for small business to innovate and big business to
recycle itself, exciting technologies for the secular, a rebirth of spiritual values
for the religious, traditional virtues for the old, radical reforms for the young,
world order and equity for globalists, energy independence for isolationists,
civil rights for liberals, and states' rights for conservatives." The broadest
implication of the soft path is a "durable peace" within and among nations.
Lovins sees very different implications for the hard path. By necessitating
large capital outlays, extensive security measures, and dependence by consumers
on systems they can neither understand nor control, the hard path "bypasses
traditional market mechanisms, concentrates political and economic power,
persistently distorts political structures and social priorities, increases alienation,
is probably inimical to greater distributional equity within and among nations,
enhances vulnerability and the paramilitarization of civilian life, and nurtures
- even requires - elitist technocracy whose exercise erodes the legitimacy of
democratic government."
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Whether these implications are certainties and to what degree they depend
on energy policy alone involves much more discussion than Lovins gives them.
But the strength of his underlying principles assures they will be discussed.
Never again will energy policy be a simple question of supply and demand.
Lovins' most doubtful contention is that hard and soft energy paths are
mutually exclusive. A commitment to the hard path will soon foreclose the
option of pursing the soft, he maintains. In the sense that a commitment to
the hard path perpetuates a wasteful attitude that in turn perpetuates the
hard path, Lovins is correct. But his arguments supporting an either/or energy
choice are never fully developed.
Instituting a coherent energy policy is never going to be easy. Lovins' ideas
are not going to make it any easier, because he is asking us to discard
deeply-rooted beliefs and assumptions. But he has made clear just how basic
and far-reaching energy issues are. His insights have changed the nature and
content of the, current energy debate for the better. Soft Energy Paths is an
outstanding book and deserves to be studied widely.
It signals the coming of age of the science of energy policy.

THE VAST MAJORITY: A Journey to the World's Poor
By Michael Harrington
Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, 1977. 281 pages. $9.95.
ISBN 0-671-22529-4

Reviewed by James P. Grant*
Michael Harrington is best known for his seminal observations of American
poverty, in "The Other America." In his newest book entitled "The Vast
Majority," Harrington analyzes international poverty, how the United States
contributes to it, and what Americans might do to advance the lot of the
world's poor. Like his earlier books, this is directed at the American people
and, as one particular, at depriving Americans of the "cruel innocence which
prevents us from seeing the wrongs we perpetrate" on the poor nations and
peoples who comprise the "vast majority" on this planet.
His shock treatment includes the accusation that most Americans are
"inexcusably unaware of the evil that is done in our name" through a "cruel
innocence" in espousing an international system of free trade and global growth
which makes the rich richer and keeps the poor poor. For Harrington, many
Americans are similar to the "good Germans" of Hitler's time, and their white
counterparts in South Africa today. Robert S. McNamara, president of the
World Bank, and James Spain, the career diplomat who is U.S. ambassador
to Tanzania, are cited as symbols. of America's cruel innocence. McNamara's
*President, Overseas Development Council, Inc.; Member of the District of Columbia Bar. B.A., University
of California at Berkeley, 1943; J.D., Harvard University, 1951. This review is reprinted from
The
Washington Post, Tuesday, January 10, 1978, with permission from James P. Grant and from
The
Washington Post.
Copyright © 1978 The Washington Post Company.

Journal of Legislation

[Vol. 5: 191

participation "in our international wrongdoing, like that of the nation itself,
is unwitting and even dedicated to effecting results that are nearly the opposite
of those that are in fact achieved." He later softens his stance by saying "my
task would be emotionally easier if those whom I criticize were evil; they are
not. But then, that is why one is permitted to hope."
One can disagree with many of Michael Harrington's arguments, as I do,
and still find this book both compelling reading and impressive in its wide-ranging
and historically perceptive analysis. His synthesis of development literature and
the inevitable litany of statistics are interspersed with notes taken on three
continents recording Harrington's intensely personal reactions to his encounters
with international poverty.
Harrington conveys a sense of urgency and indignation over the still-growing
disparity in income between the advanced countries and the developing countries
of the Third World. He notes the emergence of a Fourth World of more than
a billion people-one quarter of mankind-who live a daily agony and whose
numbers are still increasing. Yet Americans, who are so generous in responding
to natural and localized disasters, have become bored "with the tedious details
of degradation . . . let a billion men and women and children rot day after
day, and the very enormity of their reality tends to dull the moral sense."
Harrington also argues that "the first powers to benefit from free trade
saw to it that no other economies would duplicate their good luck"; that poorer
countries and regions within countries are so underdeveloped through lack of
infrastructure, education, and even physical nourishment that they are unable
to take advantage of existing systems; and that the current workings of the
multinational corporations perpetuate the relative inferiority of the developing
countries.
Specifics of Harrington's analysis can be challenged, including his blanket
characterization of foreign investment and multinationals as leeches on the
foreign exchange earnings of developing countries, without disagreeing with
his- conclusion that the existing system is not working adequately for world
development. Many Fourth World countries, most analysts would agree, are
so underdeveloped that they will need far more than a revival of the present
international trading system if they are to develop at a satisfactory rate for
the rest of this century. Major increases in development assistance will also
be required for these countries.
Some of the most interesting and illuminating parts of the book are those
in which Harrington struggles with the remedies for the exploitative system
he describes. He frankly admits that "when one shifts from what is wrong to
how to make it right there are enormous difficulties," and notes, "I am
painfully aware of how meager their (the critics') practical proposals are." He
specifically rejects the radical view that global chaos would advance the
well-being of the poor, stating that "the worst thing that could happen to the
Third World during the next 25 years would be a catastrophic collapse of
Western capitalism." He fears that such a collapse would lead to control either
by the totalitarian right, as in Germany in the 1930s, or by a Communist
bureaucratic ruling class. He believes that a return to global prosperity and
fuller employment in the industrial countries of the northern hemisphere is a
precondition for the important northern working-class support of industrialization
in the developing countries to their south. This leading American socialist also
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believes that democratic socialism has its greatest opportunity only if literacy,
productivity, and political development attain certain minimal levels-and he
notes that all Fourth World countries are still well below the per capita income
levels of the United States and the United Kingdom in 1776.
This leads logically to his agenda for action-proposals which are surprisingly
similar to those of Robert McNamara and others of alleged "cruel innocence":
"The President of the United States should solemnly commit this country to
the abolition of absolute poverty throughout the globe. That is the plight of
650 million people who live on incomes of $50 or less." He would do this
largely through measures which are under active consideration by the very
Carter Administration in which he confides so little hope: commodity agreements,
increased aid, debt relief and support of increased industrialization in the
international south with accompanying measures to provide employment for
displaced workers in the north.
Harrington notes, quite correctly, that American capitalism could make
money from a moderate increase in world justice. The same result has come
about within the industrial democracies as a result of New Deal measures
such as Social Security and collective bargaining. Certainly the United States
would be far less prosperous today if it had not shared its economic power
with, and opened its markets to, Western Europe and Japan after World War
II.
I wish Harrington had devoted more attention to the positive benefits for
the northern industrial countries that might result from increased cooperation
with the developing countries, and less to his allegations of American economic
exploitation. It is also surprising that Harrington explicitly assumes a return
to economic prosperity in the northern hemisphere independent of southern
actions. He omits the major self-interest argument-manifested by rapidly
growing evidence-that an indispensable if not sufficent condition for a return
toward the high growth with low unemployment and inflation rates of the
1960s is cooperation between the developed and developing market economy
countries. Greater proof will be needed to convince the American public that
such a program is in their interest before Harrington and others can achieve
the objective of this timely and challenging book: "to persuade a decent people
to turn toward the wretched of the earth and to cooperate with them in the
work of justice."
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BANKRUPTCY REFORM
Legislative Analysis No. 19, 95th Congress
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
Washington, D.C., January 30, 1978. 83 pages. $2 (paper).
ISBN 0-8447-0201-3

Reviewed by Thomas E. Harvey*
In 1970, following a study by the Brookings Institution I of the practical
workings of the Bankruptcy Act which noted the increase in the number of
bankruptcy cases filed each year and detailed the difficulties encountered by
those passing through the bankruptcy process, the Commission on Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States was established to "study, analyze, evaluate, and
recommend changes" in the Bankruptcy Act and in the system of bankruptcy
2
administration.
In 1973, the commission submitted its two-volume report 3 to Congress,
recommending a complete new bankruptcy code and commenting extensively
on bankruptcy practice within the United States and the ameliorating effects
of its proposed legislation. The commission's bill, then known as the Bankruptcy
Act of 1973, was introduced in Congress as H.R. 10792 and S. 2565. An
alternative bill,. introduced at the request of the National Conference of
Bankruptcy Judges, known as the "Judges' Bill," was introduced as S. 4046.
Both bills were reintroduced in the 94th Congress as H.R. 31 and H.R. 32
and as S. 235 and S. 236, and hearings were held on them.
While this complete overhaul of the bankruptcy system was being considered,
the
Supreme
Court
promulgated
Rules
of Bankruptcy
Procedure, 4 bringing about a comprehensive revision of bankruptcy practice, bringing
it more in line with the practice followed throughout the federal courts. In
effect, these procedural rules repealed a substantial portion of the Bankruptcy
Act, albeit leaving the courts to determine which substantive provisions remained
operative.
As new bankruptcy legislation has been introduced and discussed, a consensus
has been reached among most serious observers of the bankruptcy scene that
the American bankruptcy system is in need of reform. In the main, it was a
system enacted for a simpler time. The number of cases generated by today's

*White House Fellow and Special Assistant to the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. Member of the
Illinois, Indiana, New York and District of Columbia Bars. B. A., 1963, LL.B., 1966, University of Notre
Dame.
1.
2.
3.
4.

Stanley, Girth, et al., Bankruptcy: Problem, Process, Reform (The Brookings Institution, 1971).
The commission, consisting of nine members, three appointed by the President and two each by and
from the Senate, House and Judiciary, was created by Public Law 91-354, 84 Stat 468 (1970).
Report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States, H.R. Doc. No. 93-137,
Parts I and II, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
28 U.S.C. Sec. 2075 provides that "It]he
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general
rules the form of process, writs, pleadings and motions, and the practice and procedure under the
Bankruptcy Act." Such rules shall not modify any substantive rights, and all laws in conflict with
such rules shall be of no further force and effect after such rules take effect. Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure became effective at various times throughout the 1970's, the most recent being those operative
in Chapter IX cases which took effect August 1, 1976.
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credit economy have taxed the courts to the breaking point. 5 Much of the cost
of the system is devoted to cases producing little or no benefit to creditors.
Only the most hidebound counsel, fearing to see the repeal of his hard-gained
expertise, could object to bankruptcy reform.
Yet the bankruptcy bar is rigidly divided based upon the type of client
generally represented, each camp constantly on the alert to ensure that its ox
is not .the first to be gored. Lawyers representing institutional creditors are
ever vigilant to ensure protection of benefits such as the right of setoff enjoyed
by their banking clients. 6 Lawyers representing non-bank creditors are equally
focused in their effort to eliminate such perceived preferences to ensure the
availablity of assets for their creditor clients. Even bankruptcy judges, now
appointed by U.S. district judges for a six-year term, are actively concerned
about the elevation of their status under proposed reform legislation.
On January 4, 1977, Rep. Don Edwards introduced a new and completely
revised bankruptcy act in Congress, drawing upon, yet differing in significant
respects from, previously introduced legislation. Following subcommittee markup
and amendments, the bill was re-introduced on July 11, 1977 as H.R. 8200.
H.R. 8200 was passed by the House of Representatives February 1, 1978.
On October 31, 1977, S. 2266 was introduced by Senators DeConcini and
Wallop. S. 2266 differs from the House bill in several respects, including the
method of appointment, tenure and authority of bankruptcy judges, court
appointment of trustees rather than the U.S. trustee system under Attorney
General supervision, and reliance on state exemptions for debtors. That bill is
presently before the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Improvement
in Judicial Machinery.
Bankruptcy Reform, an 83-page pamphlet published by the American
Enterprise Institute as its Legislative Analysis No. 19, 95th Congress, analyzes
the House and Senate bills in detail, considering how each treats fairly broad
bankruptcy issues. The analysis then discussed arguments for and against each
position with reference to current law, the Brookings Institution study 7 and
the report of the commission. 8
As anyone knows who has attempted to compare proposed statutes covering
the same subject matter, such an analysis can be immensely helpful. The form
of this analysis is especially useful, treating issues in fairly broad terms, rather
than pointing particular semantic distinctions between parallel sections.
5.

6.

7.
8.

"In fiscal 1948, 18,510 bankruptcies were filed, as against 214,399 for the year ending June 30, 1977.
The all time high for filings was 254,484 in fiscal 1975. The number of business 1 (1978) bankruptcies
has increased for the last seven years." American Enterprise Institute, Bankruptcy Reform. Legislative
Analysis No. 19, 95th Congress, at 1 (1978).
Bankruptcy Act, Sec. 68a (11 U.S.C. Sec. 108) provides that "fiin all cases of mutual debts or mutual
credits between the estate of a bankrupt and a creditor the account shall be stated and one debt shall
be set off against the other and the balance only shall be allowed or paid." Bank deposits constitute
a debt owing by a bank to its depositor. Upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition, a bank invariably
sets off the bankrupt's deposits against any amount owed to the bank by the bankrupt, claiming the
net amount due it in the bankruptcy proceeding.
Representatives of the banking industry wax poetic in defending a bank's right of set off. In
testimony on H.R. 31 and H. R. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, Robert J. Grinnig, testifying on
behalf of the American Bankers Association, referred to the proposed changes to the right of set off
as being ."morally and commercially wrong." Hearings, Bankruptcy Act Revision, Part 3, at 1750,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). Discussion of the quality of the wrong this change would effect may
better be left to philosophers. In fact, however, elimination of setoff would have an effect on a
borrower's cost of money.
Supra note .1.
Supra note 3.
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Yet, in legislation, semantic distinctions are important, and attention must
be paid them as this bankrupty reform legislation wends its way through the
legislative process. Various interest groups can be expected to make their case
forcefully before Congress, giving rise to extensive amendment of this legislation
before it reaches the Conference Committee stage. Because the opposing forces
with an interest in this legislation are powerful, the pull between them on
different issues will be hard, and other legislative analyses such as this will
be essential to enable both bankruptcy practicioners and attorneys with only
peripheral dealings with the bankruptcy system to follow the further legislative
development in this important area.

THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
By Archibald Cox
Oxford University Press, New York, 1976. 118 pages. $6.95.
ISBN 0-19-827411-4

Reviewed by Kenneth F. Ripple*
On initial encounter, this book presents several psychological barriers for.
the American scholar or lawyer. In an era of post-Watergate memoirs, there
is an immediate impulse, upon seeing the colorful jacket with the niow familiar
photograph of the victim of the "Saturday night massacre," to dismiss this
volume as just another of the many "war stories" on today's market. Second,
upon scanning the preface and discovering that the. book is based on the four
Chichele Lectures delivered at All Souls College, Oxford, it is all too easy to
accept uncritically the author's prefatory comment that the work is geared to
a "general university audience. . . for the most part lacking professional legal
training or specialized knowledge of American history and institutions".
The persistent reader need wait' only several pages for his reward in
overcoming these initial barriers. Long before completing the first chapter, he
will become quite aware that he is experiencing a significant contribution to
American constitutional literature. Certainly, as the author readily admits, the
general topical outline is well-trodden ground (p. 1). Yet, this book crystalizes,
with a rare sharpness, the theory and practice of modern constitutional
policy-making at the Supreme Court.
In his introductory remarks, Professor Cox sets forth a threefold objective:
(1) to set out the kind of issues which come before the Court and the extent
of constitutional protection accorded individuals and minorities; (2) to inquire
into the uses and abuses of constitutional adjudication as an instrument of
social policy; (3) to inquire into the sources of the "legitimacy" of the Supreme
Court's constitutional decisions, its ability to command acceptance and compliance
with its decisions (p. 1-2). Each of these areas is indeed treated separately in
a scholarly, although highly readable, fashion. The overall result, however, is
far greater than the sum of its parts. In the end, what Professor Cox attains
*Associate Professor of Law and Director, Thomas J. and Alberta White Center for Law, Government and
Human Rights, University of Notre Dame Law School. A.B., Fordham University, 1965; J.D., University
of Virginia, 1968; LL.M., The George Washington University, 1972.
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is a particularly well-balanced and. comprehensive analysis of the role of
judicialpower in our modern democracy. As the reader proceeds, he encounters
many self-contained discussions which are sufficient food for several evenings
of sustained thought. Indeed, there is a frequent temptation to interrupt
completion of this work to renew old acquaintances in the United States
Reports. Particularly tempting is the author's challenge to Mr. Justice Holmes's
remark concerning the necessity for judicial review of Congressional enactments.
Fortunately, however, no area is so well developed nor so worthwhile as his
treatment, central to the work, of the subtle relationship between judicial
restraint and the "legitimacy" of the Court's decisions.
In developing this theme, Professor Cox begins strongly. His opening
chapter, "The Supreme Court and the System of Government," explores
essentially two topics: (1) the doctrine of judicial supremacy as the cornerstone
in our system of "checks and balances;" (2) the sources and limits of the
American people's attachment to constitutionalism. By using the "Tapes Case"
as his fulcrum, Cox breathes into his commentary that special forcefulness
and authority which only someone who "has been there" can bring to such
otherwise abstract inquiries. Cox focuses on United States v. Nixon1 neither
as an historical event culminating in the first presidential resignation nor as
a narrow holding on "presidential privilege." Rather, Nixon is presented as a
jurisprudential event: the American reaffirmation of the principle that, ultimately,
"[ilt is, emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say

what the law

is."'2

For Cox, this doctrine of judicial supremacy is rooted not in the rationale
of the Great Chief Justice in Marbury v. Madison3 but in "the rich soil of
necessity" (p. 29). Concisely, but subtly, he sets out the very important practical
relationship between this balance wheel in our separation of powers scheme
and the "case and controversy" requirement with its aim of "avoiding weakening
the courts by embroiling them unnecessarily in the turbulent waters of political
controversy" (p. 28). Noting the tendency of the Court to read the term
"unnecessarily" loosely in modern times, the author poses, rather bluntly, two
"institutional worries": (1) will the Court, by its activism, sacrifice so much
of "the power of legitimacy that attaches to decisions within the traditional
judicial sphere" as to disable itself from performing its vital balance-wheel
role in our separation of powers scheme; (2) will such judicial activism result
in an excessive reliance upon the Courts rather than on the democratic processes
and "deaden a people's sense of moral and political responsibility for their
own future. . . . " (p. 103)?
Cox's answers to these two issues pose the most thought-provoking parts
of the work. In regard to this first "worry," the author finds little danger of
the'Court's outrunning its "power of legitimacy" as long as it limits its giant
steps from the traditional judicial sphere to areas where "the change is impelled,
by one of the deeper lasting currents of human thought that give direction to
the law" (p. 111). In these areas, says Cox, our natural law inheritance
legitimates change-and, indeed, may compel it. For instance, if a constitutional
right can be newly defined under the due process clause "in principles sufficiently
1.
2.
3.

418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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absolute to give them roots throughout the community and continuity over
significant periods of time . . . " (p. 114), they will enjoy sufficient "legitimacy"
to warrant acceptance. Conversely, Cox would maintain that a judicial deviation
into an area where change is not compelled by "the lasting currents of human
thought" (p. 111) is doomed to eventual failure since it is not in harmony
with the political society's "enduring values" (p. 111). For example, the
rationale of the abortion decisions, 4 notes Cox, hardly articulates values worthy
of such legitimacy (p. 113).
Why, then, is the prospect of overruling these cases so bleak? Perhaps the
answer lies, at least partially, in the strength of Professor Cox's second "worry,"
a problem not as easily answered as he maintains. "The gieat opinions of the
Court," says Cox, rather than draining our people of moral and political
stimulus as they break new ground, can "be the voice of the spirit, reminding
us of our better selves" (p. 117). Certainly, there have been great decisions
such as Brown v. Board of Education5 which have played precisely such a
role. But the particular hardly proves the rule. Perhaps we have become too
used to accepting the Court's resolution of our social and moral concerns,
even when the opinion did not speak "to our better selves" (p. 117). Perhaps
we have abdicated so much of our political and moral conscience to the
"judicial process" that we no longer do distinguish between "ground-breaking"
opinions based on "enduring values" and those based simply on a utilitarian
"weighing process." Indeed, Cox's own criticism of modern equal protection
analysis strongly suggests that such is the case. In determining that certain
human endeavors encompass "fundamental rights" and are therefore subject
to "strict scrutiny" protection, the criteria of decision, notes Cox, are incapable
of principled articulation (p. 75).
The enduring contribution of this book may well be to make us rethink
whether the heavy reliance of Americans on judicial institutions, noted by de
Tocqueville almost two centuries ago, has caused the judiciary to "overload
the circuits" and, in so doing, to slip, half unconsciously, into elective and
political, rather than principled judgments. At the same time, perhaps our
willingness to "let the judges handle it" has dulled our sense of political values
to the point where Cox's "natural law" theory of validation is no longer
meaningful.

4.
5.

E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE POLICY
By Boris S. Pushkarev and Jeffrey M. Zupan
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1977. 242 pages. $18.50.
ISBN 0-253-34682-7

Reviewed by Arnold H. Karvasarsky*
At a time in which the cost of urban mass transit has become an increasingly
greater burden on the nation's resources, it behooves policy makers on every
level to acquire a more rigorous understanding of those factors which shape
the demand for transit service.
Those who bask in complacency, and expect that intra-regional mobility
will be maintained irrespective of land use patterns, will sooner or later face
disappointment when the economic realities of the cost of such mobility are
realized.
The benefits of intelligent land use planning are made considerably more
valuable if we are better able to understand the full economic Costs of alternative
patterns, and their impact on the mobility of residents and workers. The
benefits of intelligent transit planning are better appreciated if we are able to
understand the full economic costs of alternative modes as they impact existing
and planned land use patterns. In Public Transportation and Land Use
Policy, Messrs. Pushkarev and Zupan set out to address the major issue of
the relationship between urban residential density and transit effectiveness.
They have achieved in one volume an outstanding addition to the empirical
research in the field.
The topic is hardly a new one to urban planners and transportation
specialists, but the scope of this important study, and the rigorous analysis
provided by the authors, add a new dimension to existing literature. Public
Transportation and Land Use Policy has obvious value to the professional
planner and urban affairs specialist: its careful analysis of well-researched data
crystallizes much of the muddied waters in this field. Moreover, the wide-ranging
practical applications included in the Pushkarev/Zupan study make it particularly
important to the legislator and administrative official concerned with developing
appropriate public policies to solve the problems in this area.
Mr. Pushkarev is vice president, research and planning, for the.highly-respected
Regional Plan Association, and Mr. Zupan is the association's chief planner.
Thus, it is not surprising that the greatest portion of the empirical evidence
in this study is drawn from the expansive 31-county New York region, which
encompasses parts of New York, New Jersey and Connecticut. This by no
means limits the value of this book: the diversity of land usage patterns within
this region provides a broad spectrum of models which are applicable to any
urban setting. Numerous comparisons with other American urban centers
confirm the applicability of this analysis.
The authors begin their work with a brief review of the economics of
public transit service, most notably the responsiveness of transit demand to
quantifiable elements (notably price, service and availability of alternatives,
*Economist and Supervising Financial Analyst, Office of the Director of Finance, The Port Authority of
New York and New Jersey; Adjunct Professor of Economics, Brooklyn College of the City University of
New York.
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including, of course, the automobile). This leads into a major discussion of
the demand for transit as a function of urban densities. Finally, the reader is
led through a well-defined exercise in estimating work and non-work trip
demand from such factors as distance between origin and destination, and
residential and non-residential densities.
Since demand represents only one side of the analysis, a chapter is devoted
to the supply of transit services. These range from taxicabs, dial-a-bus and
local and express bus service to the various intensities of fixed rail. The true
economic costs of these alternates is fully discussed, in order to facilitate
comparisons between different modes of urban transportation. Complementing
the discussion of supply is a chapter concerned with the service characteristics
of these systems, as well as with the nature of "peaking" patterns.
These matters are then set forth in a particularly well-reasoned and usable
fashion, allowing the reader the luxury of analyzing the demand and supply
side for transit under alternative assumptions about urban densities and service
levels.
Policy ramifications, set forth implicitly throughout the Pushkarev/Zupan
study, are explored in depth in the book's summary, enabling legislators and
planners to explore the broad range of interrelationships which must be
considered in balancing public transportation planning with land usage policies.
Finally, the book's rigorous appendix challenges the reader to designate values
for the multitude of variables necessary to the actual determination of travel
demand in a corridor of one's own choosing. This appendix facilitates an
understanding of the complexities which affect the development of growth
patterns.
In this field, answers are cheap and plentiful. The Pushkarev/Zupan study
does considerably more than merely offer answers to frequently-raised issues.
It provides a useful, well-defined set of criteria which will enable decision-makers
to recognize alternatives in the planning process. Public Transportation and
Land Use Policy is a decidedly cost-effective investment for the man or woman
concerned with the delicate balance between land use planning and public
transportation, and for the planner or policy-maker seeking to explore alternative
modes of urban transportation and the effects of these alternatives on urban
and suburban growth patterns.

A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED
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Reviewed by Fred M. O'Regan*
Although the activities of government do not reflect it, the 1970s have
witnessed a far-reaching re-examination of the goals and methods of development
- both economic and social, domestic and international. One of the cornerstones
*Co-Director, The Development Group for Alternative Policies, Inc.
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of this re-evaluation emerged with the publication of E. F. Schumacher's
Small is Beautiful, an eloquent and practical call for the reorientation of
economic and technological processes to conform with the size, scope and
legitimate purposes of local communities.
In A Guide for the Perplexed, Dr. Schumacher delves far beyond the
reaches of economics and sociology to explore the interrelated questions of
how the world has become so "dehumanized" and how we might "transcend"
this dilemma. Since Schumacher died just a few months ago, this work
represents, in a very real sense, his intellectual epitaph. Although clearly open
to challenge in some areas, this is an important work: brilliant in logical
consistency, deep in content, concise in style. As such, it should be read as
both a major treatise on the modern world and a badly needed reintroduction
to the dying art of philosophical reasoning.
Dr. Schumacher's major thesis is that we must develop new "maps of
knowledge," or new methods of inquiry and understanding in regard to man
and the world.
Throughout the book, Schumacher insists that the bestowing of pre-eminence
upon scientific methodology as a sufficient basis for the understanding of
reality is a serious intellectual mistake, one which has ushered in an age of
"scientific imperialism," now two centuries old and threatening to destroy us.
Although spiced with theological sentiment, Schumacher's caveats regarding
our over-reliance on scientific methodology are quite consistent and often
insightful.
Given the power of man over the world, our modern dilemma is viewed
by Schumacher as essentially a human one. Thus, primary knowledge must
increasingly be sought to lend a more thorough understanding of ourselves in
relation to the world. This is a "humanization" process and must take into
account our highest faculty - self-awareness - as both a subject and object
of that investigation.
Coming back to the modern mind set, Schumacher makes his major point:
the empirical logic of science is both appropriate and useful when used for
its intended purpose - namely, to understand and "manipulate" the lower
levels of existence (i.e., those below the level of consciousness); however, once
put to use in the exploration of the higher realms (i.e., man), the method
becomes not only insufficient but dangerously misleading. That is, " . . . causality,
which rules supreme at the level of inanimate matter . . . ceases to rule . .
in the attempt to understand human nature. (p. 102).
This argument is, I believe, both valid and important. Our reliance on
empirical methodology in the attempt to understand ourselves has proved not
only insufficient, but also preclusive of further and more valid under'standing. As our logic (or phenomenology) has become restricted to the directly
sensible, we search the brain to find the mind (as if, in Schumacher's analogy,
we may know the programmer by studying the computer), and attempt to
investigate our behavior according to prescribed statistical methodologies,
specifically designed to exclude consideration of a possibly infinite number of
variables.
To illustrate his point, Schumacher examines one of the premier theories
of modern science - evolution. Whereas ancient religious practices, such as
Buddhist meditation, have long contributed to the deepening of human
understanding, they have been, in the main, dismissed as mystical. Meanwhile,
"evolutionist doctrine" (clearly distinguished by Schumacher from the biological
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theory per se) is accepted as valid while purporting to causally explain everything
from "molecules forming a membrane . . . to . . . the emergence [of the
genius] of Shakespeare." Indeed, the point he makes is not that we have
supplanted faith with reason, but that we have placed our faith in the not
totally reasonable.
Schumacher's solution to this dilemma involves "human transcendence"
above and beyond our self-imposed, intellectual "redfictionism;" in other words,
a return to the basic search for human wisdom and not the continued evasion
of it. Beyond this he is not quite clear. Seemingly, his major purpose is to
engender re-thinking and then leave the specifics up to us, although an
additional work may have been planned.
There are, of course, some drawbacks to his position. What is perhaps
most disturbing is his unyielding emphasis on man as being somehow totally
beyond the confines of nature. In fact, our current social and ecological
predicament is at least partially attributable to the continued existence of such
an essentially medieval attitude.
As with any well-reasoned philosophical treatise, however, the true value
of A Guide for the Perplexed stems as much from its mode of discourse as
from its specific conclusions. Its practical implications for the advancement of
mankind in both human and economic terms are far-reaching. If we take, for
example, one of the chief concerns of Schumacher's professional life development amongst the poor of the Third World, we find that we have.
arrogantly been tossing around large amounts of capital and sophisticated
technology with nonsustaining and often disruptive results. We continue on
this path because we fail to recognize that, in large measure, the solutions to
such problems have more to do with basic social change than economic growth.
Leaning on the crutch of seemingly endless and misdirected empirical studies,
we continue to evade essential questions which relate more basically to social
philosophy than economics. This continued reliance on "scientism" in human
problem-solving could eventually -prove disastrous, and we had best begin to
grapple with the much broader concerns of the human condition.

